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Scenes of Emergency: Dis/Re-Assembling the Promise of the UK Emergency State 
 
The paper traces the development of UK ‘state of emergency’ legislation through three 
‘scenes of emergency’: the introduction of the Emergency Powers Act in 1920, a 
revision to the Act in 1964, and discussion within government departments about 
possible changes to emergency powers in 1973. Through these scenes, and contra to 
existing work on the state of emergency as an occasion for the intensification of 
sovereignty, I show how the introduction of and revision to ‘state of emergency’ 
legislation were occasions for a double concern – with the excessiveness of the state, 
as per Foucault’s (2018) analysis of liberalism, but also for the excessiveness of events. 
In ‘scenes of emergency’ a specific ‘state effect’ (Mitchell 1991) was dis/re-assembled: 
the promise of the providential state that protected life through control of events. As 
emergency legislation was subject to deliberation and contestation, other versions of 
the state surfaced: beginning with the interested, classed, state and the tyrannical state 
as emergency powers were introduced and ending with the anxious state that loses 
faith in the efficacy of emergency powers in a world of changing events. As well as 
arguing that work on governing emergencies should be orientated to ‘scenes of 
emergency’ in which that which governs relates to excess, the paper suggests that 
assemblage approaches to the state should be concerned with dis/re-assembly.  
 








Scenes of Emergency: Dis/Re-Assembling the Promise of the UK Emergency State 
 
Prologue: November 1973 
 
The last time the UK state proclaimed a State of Emergency was on 13th 
November 1973 in response to a strike by coal miners and electricity power workers. 
On introducing the fifth time a declaration had been made in three years, the then 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Robert Carr, concluded with a wish to 
end the powers the Government held:  
 
“Finally, I need hardly say that it is the profound wish of the Government, 
and of the public at large, that these disputes should be speedily and fairly 
settled, so that the Government can ask for the emergency powers to be 
revoked. I assure the House that the Government will make as much, but 
no more, use of these powers as is absolutely necessary to fulfil our primary 
duty to the people of the country as a whole, and that we shall bring the 
powers to an end as soon as we believe it is safe to do so”1. 
 
The use of emergency powers was justified by Carr on the grounds of necessity. The 
“present situation” authorised the declaration, alongside the assumption that the state 
had a “duty” to protect the “essentials of life”. Declaring an emergency was presented 
by Carr as a secondary act that happens after the onset of and in the midst of a ‘present 
situation’. Connected to the characterisation of action as “prudent” and “wise”2 rather 
than excessive were gestures of reluctance and self-limitation by the Secretary of State. 
As well as the promise of revoking them “as soon as we believe it is safe to do so”, 
Carr goes on to stress the possibility of the non-use of the various regulations. The 
message on behalf of the Government read by Lord Windlesham in the House of 
                                                          
1 Robert Carr. House of Commons, 13 November 1973  
2 Robert Carr. House of Commons, 13 November 1973 
Lords expressed a similar reluctance: “The use of the powers will be limited, as 
always, to what the essential public interest requires”3.  
But in a ‘present situation’ in which the action of a trade union was identified by 
the Government as the cause of threatened ‘disruption’ and the use of emergency 
powers had become normal, the charge from the opposition was that government 
action was political. Opposition MPs accuse the government of “almost” having, 
“declared war on the miners”4 and of being “reprehensibly dishonest” by using the 
miners’ action as a “political alibi in order to prejudice public opinion against them”5. 
In response, the Secretary of State returned to his characterisation of the situation:  
 
“There is no doubt in my mind that, because of the situation arising out of 
industrial action being taken in the coal and electricity industries on top of 
the uncertainty about oil, we are right to have taken these powers, and right 
to have taken them now. If the Opposition persist in their charge that there 
was some sinister political motive for this action, or for its timing, that, I 
believe is more a commentary on their approach to these matters than on 
ours, and I am prepared to let the country judge which is the right course 
to take”6.  
 
Introduction: The Emergency State 
 
Emergency declarations such as those issued in 1973 are typically associated 
with the foreclosure of deliberation, contestation, and other habits and actions taken 
to be necessary for democratic action (see Scarry 2005). The claim of necessity by the 
state – and associated affect of urgency and the presence of an interval for action 
(Anderson 2015) – authorises exceptional action. However, the use of ‘state of 
emergency’ legislation in 1973 precipitated an intensified scene of contestation. It was 
precisely the claim of necessity (and the linked claim of disinterest on the part of the 
                                                          
3 Lord Windlesham. House of Lords, 13 November 1973  
4 Eric Ogden. House of Commons, 15 November 1973  
5 Elystan Morgan. House of Commons, 15 November 1973  
6 Robert Carr. House of Commons, 15 November 1973  
state) that the opposition subjected to heated and repeated contestation. The anti-
emergency claims by the opposition were various – that a state of emergency was not 
necessary at that time, that it was not necessary as other action was possible and 
desirable, and that the government made the declaration for cynical or interested 
reasons – but what reoccurred was an attempt to disrupt the status of necessity as the 
authorising ground for the declaration of an emergency.  
 In this paper, I describe three scenes across the twentieth century in which UK 
emergency legislation was subject to deliberation and contestation: the introduction 
in 1920 of the legislation the 1973 declaration was based upon, an amendment to the 
original legislation in 1964, and discussion within government throughout 1973 on the 
need to revise the legislation. Drawing on archival research, the paper tells the hitherto 
untold story of twentieth century emergency legislation in the UK (although see 
Agamben (2003: 19) for brief comments). To date, critical work in geography, security 
studies, and international relations has focused on the contemporary arrangement of 
emergency governance in the wake of the war on terror, placing the UK in the context 
of changes in how events and conditions are governed in a turbulent world (see 
O’Grady 2018; Zebrowski, 2015; Amin 2013). Complementing this work, I focus on the 
emergency legislation that pre-dated the current 2004 Civil Contingencies Act (on 
which see Anderson & Adey 2012). By staying with the contestation that surrounded 
emergency legislation during the twentieth century, I show that actual or imagined 
emergencies were problematic for the UK state: occasions where the state reasserted 
a key promise – to protect life and act neutrally – and occasions where that promise 
became fragile. As the state reasserted the promise that it would respond effectively 
and neutrally, other versions of the state proliferated. In the above scene, imaginative 
‘state-effects’ (after Mitchell 1991) surface through competing emergency and anti-
emergency claims: the prudent state, the provocative state, the cynical state, etc.  
In addition to telling the story of emergency legislation in the UK and showing 
how scenes of emergency serve as occasions for particular forms of contestation rather 
than only the intensification of sovereign power, I explore what the state is and 
becomes in relation to emergency. I do so in order to supplement emerging 
assemblage related approaches to the state by advocating a focus on scenes that 
confound lines between disassembly and reassembly. Current work on the state in the 
wake of Feminist and poststructural approaches attempts to show how the effect of 
the state – the affective-imaginative and material appearance of the state as a unitary 
actor separate from society – is achieved through a host of mundane practices (e.g. 
McConnell 2009; Coleman & Stuesse 2016; Painter 2006). As Desbians et al (2004: 242) 
put it: “the state is not a unitary object but is, rather, a set of practices enacted through 
relationships between people, places, and institutions”. The mistake is presuming 
what Mitchell (1991: 78) calls the “coherence, unity and absolute autonomy” of the 
state (see also Painter 2006). As with many other research objects in contemporary 
human geography, the task of analysis becomes to describe and thus reveal the 
multiplicity and contingency of a seemingly unitary object. The hope of this approach 
is that revealing contingency weakens the unitary object, and opens up the possibility 
of change. This leads to a problem, though: how to account for the affective, material 
and imaginative presence of the state as a unitary actor? The problem haunts 
Mitchell’s (1991) vocabulary in his influential paper on state effects. After Foucault, he 
describes ‘the state’ as an “almost transcendental entity” (Mitchell 1991: 94, emphasis 
added), a “practical yet ghost-like effect” (91), and focuses on how a line is drawn 
“internally” within a “network of institutional mechanisms” (78) to produce the 
“apparent autonomy of the state as a free-standing entity” (91). The same problem 
surfaces across recent work that develops from Mitchell. The state, as Woodward 
(2014: 23) describes it, “arises like a tune in one’s head that can be neither shaken nor 
identified”. It is in relation to this problem of unity in the midst of contingency that 
assemblage-related approaches have offered a solution. They provide a conceptual 
vocabulary and a disposition or ethos which emphasises the gathering together of 
disparate parts in “open wholes” (DeLanda 2016). By describing processes of 
assembly, rather than formed assemblages, they also avoid any presumptions about 
form (so avoiding treating the state as a unitary whole). The paper begins from this 
approach, but develops it by arguing that assemblage related approaches need to be 
supplemented by a focus on specific occasions in which processes of assembly and 
dis– and re- assembly blur and become indeterminate. ‘Scenes of emergency’ are one 
such occasion in which ‘the state’ is simultaneously being disassembled and 
reassembled as the excess of events is made present.  
These arguments develop across four sections. The first section supplements 
recent work on ‘governing through emergency’ with assemblage-based approaches to 
the state, by arguing that understanding the liberal emergency state requires staying 
with how it encounters and relates to the excess of events. This leads to an emphasis 
on processes of dis/re- assembly in ‘scenes of emergency’. The rest of the paper traces 
how the promise of the state was (dis/re)assembled in 1920, 1964, and 1973. By staying 
with the emergency and anti-emergency claims that animate the three scenes, I argue 
that emergency legislation becomes an occasion for the surfacing of anxieties about 
the authoritarian state and then the unprepared state as the liberal concern with the 
excessiveness of the state mixes with concern for the excessiveness of events. The 
paper concludes by setting out the implications of the orientation to ‘scenes of 
emergency’ for understanding the emergency state, and articulating the contribution 
of a focus on dis/re-assembly to existing research on the (de)formation of the state.   
 
Section One: Forms of Emergency 
 
Recent research has documented the role of emergencies, disasters and other 
disruptive events to the emergence, endurance and intensification of the modern ‘state 
effect’ (Mitchell 1991): the state as a “totalising totality” (see Ophir 2007). The 
affective/imaginative-material effect of the state as a powerful, unified, totality – or 
what Ophir (2007 no pagination) calls “an imaginary singular person and an 
imaginary integrated totality” – is in part enacted through the state’s promised control 
over the occurrence of ordinary and catastrophic events within a territory.  
For Ophir, the emergence of this modern ‘state effect’ is shared by both of the 
chronologically and formally distinct state apparatuses through which states govern 
emergencies: the ‘catastrophic state’ that threatens harm and the ‘providential state’ 
that promises protection. Both state apparatuses – and Ophir uses the term state 
apparatuses and state formations interchangeably – ‘tend towards’ emergency, in the 
sense of being orientated towards an external event or situation. However, for Ophir, 
the providential emergency state and the catastrophic emergency state differ formally 
in their relation with life and death: 
 
“The catastrophic state governs an already abandoned population; the body and 
living conditions of any individual or of many at once may be hurt, damaged, or 
destroyed altogether without changing anything in the state’s modus operandi. 
The providential state governs — or may sometimes simply reach without 
governing—people whose right to live, sometimes even to live well, it has 
recognized ... 
(Ophir 2007, no pagination) 
 
Ophir argues that although there is a chronological difference between the two 
apparatuses, they have now fused in the midst of the extension of the ‘war on terror’. 
Nevertheless, in distinction from Agamben (2003), Ophir stresses the formal 
distinction between care and destruction as relations with life. The coexistence and 
entanglement of providential and catastrophic relations in particular apparatuses is, 
for Ophir contra Agamben, a contingent matter. What is shared across those relations 
with life is, though, that the ‘state’ emerges through its relation with emergencies and 
the harm, damage, loss and so on that emergencies threaten. By offering a formal 
distinction, Ophir pushes us to understand the different ways in which a ‘state effect’, 
in Mitchell’s (1991) terms, emerges as states governs (through anticipation, response, 
recovery, and other practices and logics) events or situations that threaten it. For the 
providential state organised around the ideal and promise of absolute control to 
achieve absolute prevention, for example, emergencies become an occasion where, as 
Ophir (2007, no pagination) puts it, “the gap between this perfect potentiality [of the 
providential state] and the impaired and partial reality is exposed”. Typically, this 
‘exposure’ of a gap through formalised practices such as public inquiries or via 
demands by affected publics leads to practices that aim to improve the state’s 
capacities to predict and respond. The assumption being that the state is the kind of 
actor that could and should offer protection and control events (notwithstanding that 
this expectation and promise is unevenly attached to by different publics, including 
racialised groups who live in disastrous proximity to the workings of the catastrophic 
state that brings violence (Grove 2014; Wakefield & Braun 2014)).  
Ophir’s work is important because it reminds us how central events and 
responses to them have been to the reproduction of the modern ‘state effect’, although 
we might also remember how emergencies can be occasions for the refusal, 
contestation or breakdown of that effect (after Schmidt (2018) on the ‘refusal’ of state-
effects). However, an important consequence of Ophir’s formalism is that he does not 
focus on how exactly emergencies pose problems for particular states. We can extend 
Ophir’s work by focusing on how emergencies can be troubling occasions for any 
liberal state which, even after the contracting of the material actuality and promise of 
the state through neoliberalism, promises protection to a population (on the relations 
of ‘failed states’ to emergency see Duffield (2010)). States govern events or situations 
as emergencies because, in some way, they threaten harm, loss, damage or suffering 
to ‘something’ the state values and recognises (whether that ‘something’ be an 
infrastructure, people, living beings, or an atmosphere of control and continuity). The 
claim by the state is that harm and damage is happening and/or is imminent, but an 
‘interval’ (Anderson 2015) of time remains for action. Nevertheless, in an emergency 
something that appears to be outside of the state, some kind of excess, disrupts and 
threatens to break and end its capacities to act and secure life.  
The trouble that emergencies pose for and to the state has not been central to 
existing critical work on emergencies which, after Agamben (2003), has in the main 
focused on emergencies as occasions for the intensification of sovereign power. 
Staying with the trouble that emergencies pose requires that we shift from a formal 
analysis of specific relations with life to how ‘the state’ takes form in relation to 
emergencies – where ‘the state’ is at once a material, imaginative, and affective 
formation. Recent work on the assembling of specific ways of governing in, through 
and by emergency demonstrates the specific forms through which ‘state effects’ are 
achieved in relation to events (e.g. Grove 2014; Adey 2016; Fredriksen 2014; O’Grady 
2018a). As such, assemblage influenced approaches to the state shift analysis from an 
Agamben informed concern with the relation with life to the ensemble of elements 
(including relations with life) that are held together for emergencies to be governed.  
The emergency state might, then, exist as a similar kind of object of analysis to 
any other seemingly coherent ‘thing’ that assemblage as concept or ethos has been 
applied to. The orientation is to assembly; the situated, provisional, processes through 
which an ‘open whole’ comes to form (e.g. Dittmer 2017; Müller 2015; Squire 2015). 
However, returning to and staying with the problem that emergencies pose to the state 
might interrupt this now almost habitual gesture of understanding anything and 
everything that appears to be coherent in terms of ongoing processes of assembly. 
Whether actual or anticipated, emergencies are occasions where things fall apart, or 
potentially fall apart. What falls apart varies, it may be people’s lives or a fantasy of 
the state’s omnipotence, a plan that is rendered unworkable or an existing piece of 
legislation that becomes out of date, but in all cases something may end or change as 
the state relates to excess. By which I mean that in an emergency or in anticipation of 
emergency some kind of excess that does not fit with a current arrangement becomes 
a problem for the state and exerts a material and/or imaginative and/or affective force 
(see O’Grady (2018b) on elemental forces as one form of excess). Excess is present 
affectively at the event of an accident, for example, in the confusion and disorientation 
of responders as they attempt to make sense. It may be present in the halting words, 
pauses and recollections that make up testimony at an inquiry as what happened is 
retrospectively pieced together. Excess also happens as politicians justify a new piece 
of emergency legislation in parliament on the basis that existing legislation is no 
longer appropriate for today’s complex world, or in a control room as staff work 
collaboratively to work out what, if anything, is happening.  
The emphasis on the problem that the excess of events poses to the state as it 
attempts to govern emergencies shifts attention in assemblage related work to the 
complex entanglements between assembly and processes of dis/re - assembly. 
Emergency states are constantly being disassembled but also reassembled in relation 
to excess. Despite the emphasis on the provisionality and precariousness of 
assemblages which follows from the orientation to agencement and the emphasis on 
assemblages as ‘open wholes’, processes of de/re assembly have received less 
attention in assemblage related work on emergency and elsewhere. Notwithstanding 
the importance of de/re-coding and de/re-territorialization to Deleuzian versions of 
assemblage theory (see DeLanda 2016; Dewsbury 2011), the emphasis has been on the 
non-linear emergence and composition of assemblages7. By contrast, what I am calling 
‘scenes of emergency’ involve actual and/or possible disassembly as the excess of 
events overwhelms, ends, disrupts, intrudes, questions, or otherwise acts. As used 
here, disassembly is an umbrella term for processes of removing, ending, subtracting, 
fraying etc in which previously assembled and stable parts, and/or relations between 
parts, are changing in ways that may shift assemblages between states. Consequently, 
processes of disassembly may result in something seemingly formed falling or coming 
apart. By ‘scenes of emergency’ I mean any occasion where states have proximity to the 
problem of excess and therefore disassembly may happen: testimony in an inquiry, 
debate during parliament, discussion between government departments, exercises 
that enact response, as well as the space-times where incidents and accidents happen. 
More precisely, a scene of emergency is future orientated - including when past events 
are made present (e.g. in an inquiry) or a current event is happening (e.g. as an event 
is unfolding). They involve anticipatory practices and statements which make futures 
present in a manner that enables the excess of events to be made actionable. In public 
inquiries, car crashes, planning meetings and other ‘scenes of emergency’, the state 
encounters events and those events shift between different ‘modes of eventfulness’ 
(Berlant 2011) – from threatening catastrophes to recognised occurrences, from vague 
worry to looming threat, from stable situation to outbreaks, to name but some modes.  
However, the state not only being disassembled in ‘scenes of emergency’. It is 
also being reassembled – in the sense that parts and/or relations are reconnected in a 
bid to enable the continuity and continuation of phenomena. By which I mean that 
some aspect of the state - the credibility of a promise, for example – is on a threshold. 
It is in-between falling apart and ending and being preserved or remade and 
continuing. By invoking the spatio-temporal image of a threshold, I am trying to 
                                                          
7 I use the term dis and re assembly in this paper rather than the Deleuzian conceptual vocabulary of 
de/recoding and de/reterritorialization for two reasons, despite the similarities. First, assemblage 
primarily functions in this paper as an ethos that stays with the problematic of composition and change 
in seemingly stable phenomena. Second, I want to avoid some of the Deleuzian assumptions about 
subjects and worlds, in particular around flows and the body without organs, that the terms 
coding/territorialisation hold. In particular, ‘the event’ functions here in a way that isn’t equivalent to 
the event in Deleuze. My emphasis is on how events change form and therefore shift between ‘modes 
of eventfulness’ through practices which establish proximity to excess.      
attune to an in-between state where change is happening but the outcome is uncertain 
and an assemblage has not-yet qualitatively shifted. In this threshold, processes of dis 
and reassembly combine to produce emergency states. Importantly, disassembly and 
reassembly vary across the state’s material, imaginative and affective dimensions, not 
necessarily happening across all three simultaneously. It might be, for example, that 
the emergency state persists as a more or less coherent material formation with an 
imaginative unity, but the cluster of promises that envelop it may ‘fall or come apart’ 
and have to be remade. Consider, for example, a public inquiry into the response to 
an event as a scene in which the state’s promise to respond frays and falls apart, as the 
event is made present again and structural and situational failures are revealed amid 
anger, recrimination and other affects of loss and injustice. The state as material actor 
persists, but its promise is lost, even if momentarily, and even allowing for the already 
unevenly distributed attachment to the state’s promises. Of course, an inquiry is also 
a scene of optimism in which that promise can be repaired – that failures can be 
identified and the state can improve its response. ‘Scenes of emergency’ are also, 
therefore, occasions where aspects of the emergency state may be reassembled. Of 
course, in some ‘scenes of emergency’ the state may ‘fall or come apart’ as a material 
actor, as well as affective-imaginative formation, and not be reassembled. Tracking 
the becoming-event of the 2018 hurricanes in Puerto Rico, Bonilla (2020), for example, 
follows how people’s attachment to the state gradually waned as the emergency state 
failed to materialise in an extended interval of emergency. As people waited, harm 
intensified, and the state failed to respond, what fell apart and was lost was both the 
state as a material formation and as a cluster of promises that people attached to.   
My focus in this paper is on ‘scenes of emergency’ in which the promise of the 
providential state that protects from emergencies is disassembled and reassembled8. 
By which I mean that what is at stake is the existence and legitimacy of the state’s 
claim that it both can and will protect the population. The promise involves both the 
                                                          
8 By ‘promise’ I mean a future orientated commitment to give or do something (or refrain from doing 
something) that the state implicitly or explicitly makes (which frequently involves a claim about the 
potential the state has to do something). The promise is constitutive in that it brings that future into the 
present – say, the capacity to respond well in an emergency and secure life – and creates networks of 
obligation and expectation as people attach and invest in it. Any state’s legitimacy is constituted, in 
part, by a cluster of promises; with promises varying in content across different state formations.  
state’s will to act – that the state is neutral and wishes to act to protect – and its capacity 
to act – that the state has the potential to respond. ‘Scenes of emergency’ vary. The 
scenes in this paper are all of a specific type: discussion in parliament and between 
government departments surrounding the need for emergency legislation. Excess is 
not materially present in these scenes. There are no dead bodies or raging fires. Rather, 
the excess of events is imaginatively and affectively present through verbal and 
written statements about future events and future states. The excess of events is 
present through practices which create future presents of damage and destruction that 
challenge the credibility of the promise of the neutral and/or capable state. These are 
not, let me stress, scenes in which ‘the state’ as a material actor falls apart, particularly 
given the constitutional role of parliamentary critique and scrutiny and ubiquity of 
intra and inter department discussion and deliberation (see Neal 2019) 9 . On the 
contrary, parliamentary discussion and intra-departmental deliberation are key state 
practices through which the UK state in a representational democracy persists. 
Indeed, the UK state is assembled through ongoing acts of proposition, justification, 
contestation, and deliberation in relation to future presents. What makes them ‘scenes 
of emergency’ is that even as the state is being assembled the cluster of promises that 
surround the state are at risk of ‘falling or coming apart’.  
I draw on two main archival sources to describe the 1920, 1964 and 1973 scenes, 
based on a year of archival work on UK emergency legislation and planning10. First, 
Hansard records were used to analyse parliamentary debates in 1920, 1964, and 2004 
as emergency planning legislation was introduced or amended, as well as each of the 
twelve times an emergency was declared in the twentieth century under the (amended 
in 1964) 1920 Emergency Powers Act. All parliamentary speech surrounding the 
introduction of or changes to legislation over the 20th century was gathered. Analysis 
                                                          
9 Neal’s (2019) work is important here in challenging the frequent claim that security politics more 
broadly is a politics of exception and analysing parliament as a space of politisation. What his work 
shows to is a range of forms of politisation – including by volume of scrutiny by active 
parliamentarians, as well as the more frequently discussed polarisation, controversy and contestation 
(see also Neal 2018).  
10 The wider project focuses on the ‘becoming-event’ of emergencies across practices of legislating, 
planning, exercising, responding, and inquiring. As well as the archive research detailed below, it 
involved research on contemporary emergency governance, including observation of exercises, 
interviews with emergency planners, attendance at inquiries as well as documentary analysis of 
testimony at past inquiry, and documentary analysis of emergency planning documents.  
focused on how legislation and the use of legislation was justified by governments 
and the range of responses to legislation by other parties and parliamentarians. 
Second, material was gathered from the UK National Archives on how central 
government organised in relation to and planned for emergencies over the same 
period of time, with particular emphasis on material related to the government 
departments which have held central responsibility for emergencies, principally the 
Home Office (including the Emergency Planning Unit and Home Office Emergencies 
Organisation) and the Cabinet Office (including the Civil Contingencies Unit from 
1972 onwards) 11 . The National Archive material was used to track changing 
institutional arrangements for governing emergencies, justifications for changes, and 
deliberations around possible changes. The first scene returns us to the introduction 
of emergency powers in the UK.  
 
Section Two: Scenes of Emergency    
 
The 1920 Emergency Powers Act is typical of the advent of Emergency Powers 
across liberal democratic regimes in Europe and the United States in the interwar 
years. Emerging from the delegations of emergency economic authority to the 
executive during World War 1 and building on the 19th century use of emergency 
authority by elites to end labour and socialist unrest that supposedly threatened civil 
insurrection (Scheuerman 2000; Mitchell 2011), the Powers are explicitly orientated to 
trade unions and the activity and situation of strikes (and thus separate from military 
conflict or armed rebellion). Unlike the 1914 Defence of the Realm Act, the 1920 Act 
granted powers over economy and life during emergencies not limited to war.  
The state of emergency is a technique that, at least as presented, aims to resolve 
the problem of what happens when the state assumes a duty to maintain life but is 
faced by situations that threaten serious disruption but are also unique. Put 
                                                          
11 Archives at the UK’s Emergency Planning college were also consulted, but that material is not used 
in this paper. For the National Archive material, I retain the location identifier. The archive material 
was photographed and copies stored in a database organised by government department (and then 
chronologically within government department). The parliamentary material was also stored in a 
database and organised around key pieces of emergency legislation. Analysis was through the 
composition of timelines of changes, followed by reading and rereading of specific statements.   
differently, the state of emergency as legal-political technique is one way of 
recognising and incorporating the excess of events into the purview of the state. 
Declarations of emergency by the sovereign were authorised by a particular kind of 
event:    
 
“Her Majesty may by proclamation declare that a state of emergency exists 
if at any time it appears to Her that any action has been taken or is 
immediately threatened by any persons or body of persons of such a nature 
and on so extensive a scale as to be calculated, by interfering with the 
supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or light, or with the means of 
locomotion, to deprive the community, or any substantial portion of the 
community, of the essentials of life”.    
(Emergency Powers Act 1920)  
 
As with all state of exception legislation, the Act is simultaneously a recognition of 
law’s (and the state’s) limit and an attempt to encompass the exception that threatens 
harm or damage within law (and the state) (Agamben 2003). The effect of the 
legislation is to reproduce the state-effect Ophir (2007) associates with emergency: the 
state as a total entity with the capacity to act. However, parliament is also a scene for 
the accusation that the powers are excessive and the disassembly of the promise of the 
state as neutral, disinterested, party. Introduced in the midst of industrial tensions and 
implicitly referring to trade unions (‘any persons or body of persons”) (on which see 
Keith & Hennessy 1983), the credibility of the promise of the neutral state is challenged 
through a set of anti-emergency statements and claims by opposition politicians.  
 
3a: Scene One: 22nd October 1920 
  
 On first reading of the Bill, H.H. Asquith – then leader of the opposition Liberal 
Party – argued that it was unnecessary in the absence of an emergency:  
  
“The Government have in their possession all the powers that are needed 
for any risks or dangers which at present confront us. That being the case, 
surely the elementary dictates of political prudence, not to say 
statesmanship, indicate that it would be better, for the time being, to rely 
upon those powers, and not at a most inopportune time, to pass permanent 
legislation of the kind contemplated by this Bill. It is not a matter of urgency 
at all. There is no emergency which calls at this moment for legislative 
action”12. 
 
The anti-emergency claim by Asquith was threefold: that there was no emergency, 
that the state already possessed all the powers it may need, and that it was an 
“inopportune time” given the turbulent post war public mood. Consequently, for the 
opposition, the Bill was a “provocation” that was “calculated to arouse the suspicions 
of the working class” in midst of the “crisis in the mining industry”13. One MP accuses 
the Government of not taking into account the “psychology of the situation” and 
warns that “there will be created an atmosphere outside this House which will be 
distinctly harmful to the progress of friendly negotiations”14. Another MP cautions in 
similar terms of the consequences for the present dispute of a “mood of suspicion” 
amongst “men who do believe this is an attack on trade unionism”15.  
Emergency powers were not only dangerous for the extra-legal effects that the 
passage of a Bill might have had in the midst of a tense atmosphere, though. In later 
discussions in the House of Commons, other MPs claimed they were also dangerous 
for how they fundamentally reshape the balance of forces within society. Some MPs 
accused the state of other, hidden motives: notably a class politics that aimed to crush 
the power of the labour movement. It is worth quoting at length one objection, as it 
folds into the scene of emergency past events by charging the Government with a 
“cunningly veiled attack” on the trade unions.  
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“In 1911 there was not only a railway strike, but practically half the dockers 
were on strike. The whole port of Liverpool was closed. There were 
ironclads in the river. There were tremendous riots and disorder. There was 
no suggestion that this kind of legislation was necessary. In 1912 the whole 
of the mines of the country were stopped for between six and seven weeks, 
and it was never suggested by even the most reactionary that legislation of 
this kind was necessary. Let anybody go into these particular conditions, 
and he is bound to see that this is not an open but a cunningly veiled attack 
upon the powers now-possessed by trade unions, and that the Title of the 
Bill should rather be "a Bill to revoke the whole of the Statutes since 1824 
conferring legal powers upon trade unions”16. 
 
Something of the then present atmosphere of heightened tensions, as well as 
affectively imbued memories of past conflicts, became part of the scene in parliament. 
By invoking a series of past situations that did not necessitate the introduction or use 
of special powers, the Emergency Powers Bill is enacted as an instrument of class 
politics and the state becomes a cunning, duplicitous actor.  
The introduction of legislation becomes a scene in which the promise of the 
disinterested state is disassembled as other claims are made: the state as a classed, 
interested, actor with a threatening capacity to reorder society. There is, though, a 
second version of the state that emerges in the wake of the disassembly of a promise: 
an anxiety about the becoming authoritarian of the democratic state that is enacted 
through concerns about what the state is enabled to do by the Bill. Here we see an 
intensification of the concern with what Foucault (2008: 322) calls “the irrationality 
peculiar to excessive government” that he argues animates liberalism. Emergency 
Powers becomes the point, to paraphrase Foucault (ibid. 320), where the state governs 
“too much” and the liberal democratic state becomes the monster that must be kept in 
check. We gain a sense that emergency legislation is itself a threat when the Bill moves 
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to committee stage. Unusually, committee stage happened four days after the first 
reading of the Bill. Committee stage starts with an objection to the first words of 
Clause 1 of the Bill - “at any time” - , in part as a protest at what opposition MPs 
consider to be the compression of the time for deliberation. Mr Walter Smith argues 
that there is a mismatch between the seriousness of powers and the time given for 
“close examination and scrutiny”:   
 
“There has been no opportunity whatever for giving that close examination 
and scrutiny to this Measure which its importance warrants, and yet the 
Government propose to make it a permanent part of their legislation to be 
used whenever the Government of the day deems a state of emergency has 
arisen which justifies its provisions becoming operative. I venture to 
suggest that that is a very dangerous procedure. We may have a sudden 
election during a period of passing excitement, and a Government may be 
returned to power which might use the provisions of a Bill such as this very 
largely for political purposes against their opponents” 17. 
  
For Smith, emergency powers require the time for practices of deliberation: 
“discussion of every detail and for the examination of every line and word”18. What 
animates dissent is a concern by opposition MPs with the potential misuse of powers. 
Expressed by MPs as the Bill becomes an object of explicit concern is the threat of a 
different type of exceptional situation than that invoked by proponents of the Bill. The 
possible exception is the misuse of the Powers by a tyrannical, illiberal state.  
 
3b: Scene 2: 20th February 1964 
 
The introduction of emergency powers was an occasion for anti-emergency 
statements that disassembled a promise: the neutral state acting through necessity. 
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Through those statements, the state was enacted as an actual threat – to the existing 
powers of the trade unions – and a potential threat – to the ‘liberty of the subject’ and 
democracy itself. Anxiety, mistrust and anger enveloped the introduction of 
emergency powers, perhaps resonating with then moods of a ‘present situation’ of 
industrial tensions and the near past of previous conflicts (Keith & Hennessy 1983). 
These concerns enacted the liberal suspicion about the state governing too much that 
Foucault (2018: 319) highlights, but assemble them with two distinct state imaginaries: 
the all-powerful despotic state and the interested, classed, state. For proponents in 
government, by contrast, emergency powers are not merely necessary but also 
prudent given the possibility of exceptional situations. Emergency becomes an 
occasion where the question of the excessiveness of the state, its “necessity and 
usefulness”, is played out and subject to deliberation (ibid 319).   
The legislation was the basis for the 11 times a state of emergency was declared 
in the UK, all in relation to industrial disputes. In 1964, a small but significant change 
was made to the 1920 Emergency Powers Act. As well as making permanent the 
Defence (Armed Forces) Regulations of 1939 that allowed for the use the armed forces 
in temporary employment in agriculture or other work considered to be of “national 
importance”, the then conservative government proposed a change should be made 
to the definition of emergency in the 1920 Act. As we have seen, the concern in the 
1920 Act was with a specific causal agent – ‘persons or body of persons’ - and, 
although not stated as such in the Act, with one type of situation – strikes and 
industrial disputes. The 1964 Act amended this definition by replacing the phrase 
‘persons or body of persons’ with the word ‘events’, so it reads:  
  
“Her Majesty may by proclamation declare that a state of emergency exists 
if at any time it appears to Her that any action there have occurred, or are 
about to occur, events of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be 
calculated, by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, 
fuel or light, or with the means of locomotion, to deprive the community, 
or any substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life” 
(Emergency Powers Act (amended) 1964, emphasis added) 
 
The amendment widened the scope of emergency powers to the open-ended ‘events’, 
irrespective of the type of event or the cause for the event.  
In the second reading of the Bill on 20th February 1964 the Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Henry Brooke, justified the expansion in the following terms, 
invoking a different event before which the providential state may be powerless: 
weather:   
  
“It was during the prolonged bad weather of last winter that I first started 
to think about the limitations on our powers to take emergency action in a 
national emergency. Clause 1 amends the Emergency Powers Act, 1920. 
When that Act was passed the country was in the throes of readjusting itself 
to peace-time after the First World War. As many of us remember, it was a 
time of industrial unrest. That was the problem in view, and so the Act was 
directed at emergencies resulting from labour troubles. It was confined to 
them. 
Its purpose was, and is, to enable the Government of the day to take 
measures to maintain supplies which are essential to the life of the 
community. But there is no obvious reason why the Government should be 
able to take these measures only when supply difficulties are threatened as 
a result of labour troubles. The threat may come from other causes; from 
what the insurance policies refer to as an act of God, or indeed from 
developments in other countries beyond our control. 
If since 1920, all Governments have been granted special powers to secure 
essential supplies for the public in times of industrial emergency, it seems 
common sense to make similar provision for dealing with any type of 
emergency in the future which similarly threatens the essentials of life”19.  
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Describing the Bill as a “wise exercise in foresight” and an “insurance policy” 20, 
Brooke justified the extension to ‘events’ as necessary because of the spectre of 
possible future ‘exceptional’ events that threatened the always fragile providential 
state’s capacity to respond. In this scene, the state confronted a different form of excess 
– events as such, rather than the actions of a trade union. Although a range of ‘new’ 
emergencies were invoked by proponents of the amendment, including mechanical 
breakdown of nuclear power stations and stoppage of essential supplies from abroad, 
it was ‘weather’ that stood in for events that threaten the state:  
 
“I would like the House to know that after last winter the Government 
undertook a comprehensive review of all the arrangements everywhere for 
coping with bad weather. As a result of that review, many steps have been 
taken—steps to improve equipment, to acquire additional emergency 
equipment, to coordinate plans at all levels, and to encourage preparations 
for bad winter conditions. But there is a limit to the money which it is 
sensible to authorise on emergency provisions which may never be used, 
and the best plans may be defeated in an emergency on a scale which out-
soars anything ever previously contemplated. 
The problem is to strike the right balance. With the action already taken 
and planned, we think that we have gone as far as we practically can by 
administrative means and forethought to take precautions against severe 
and prolonged snow and frost. But one must recognise that circumstances 
may arise so utterly exceptional that all precautions might be inadequate. 
That is why we think that emergency powers ought to be available as a last 
resort, not confined to industrial disputes only” 21 .  
 
The proposed change in legislation was legitimised around the invocation of a series 
of ‘extreme’ or ‘abnormal’ possibilities that exceeded government’s capacity to plan, 
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or what was referred to by Brooke as ‘administrative means and forethought’. He 
invoked a twin problem for the providential emergency state: the possible future 
event that is ‘exceptional’ and ‘unforeseen’. Whilst not quite equivalent, the two ways 
of registering occurrence and impact mean that rationalisations for the Bill are 
organised around a slight tweak to the version of emergency that that was embedded 
in the 1920 Emergency Powers Act - the event as a ‘real exception’. As well as rarity 
and severity of impact, the shift to the generic ‘events’ intensifies the problem of the 
unforeseen. Unlike strikes, with their defined actors and precipitating conditions 
(‘tensions’), ‘events’ may happen without warning. ‘Acts of God’ are so named 
precisely because of the problem of ascribing causality to them. They appear to come 
from nowhere. For this reason, Brooke described the Bill as “an insurance policy 
against contingencies—remote contingencies, perhaps, but real ones nevertheless”22. 
 Parliament became, then, a scene of emergency: the excess of events (in the 
form of the ‘exceptional’ and ‘unforeseen’) was present as a problem for the state. 
What was enacted was the promise of the providential, prudent, state which may need 
extra powers. As in 1920, the introduction of the Bill was also a scene of contestation 
where the promise of the providential state was disassembled. The tyrannical state 
was not expressively present, but was there in the background to claims that the state 
already possessed the resources needed to govern emergencies. One MP challenges 
the home secretary to either “think of one example when it would have been desirable 
to make these regulations” at some point since 1920 or give a future example, even a 
“barely imaginable” example, of a “possible situation” that would require regulations 
to be made under the Act23. As he did so, he offered a different account of past events 
that render them undramatic - matters of “inconvenience” or “discomfort”:  
 
“I would test the position by asking the right hon. Gentleman to think of 
any situation relating to the happening of a natural cause, like the cold 
weather of last year, in the 44 years that have elapsed since the 1920 Act 
was passed when it would have been desirable or necessary to make 
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regulations under this Bill had it been law. Consider the cold weather last 
year, which occasioned a great deal of discomfort and inconvenience. Is the 
right hon. Gentleman saying that there would have been regulations made 
to deal with that situation had the Bill been law? If so, what sort of 
regulations would have been made?”24 
 
In comparison with the contestation which greeted the 1920 Act, the criticism of the 
amendment is focused on the past or future presence of events. As Soskice remarks, 
he does not have “any violent objection in principle to the Bill”25. Indeed, he accepts 
the need for the state to be “be ready for emergencies”, but considers the case for the 
amendment to rest on “wholly hypothetical contingencies which are unlikely to be 
translated into reality according to all the experience we have had” 26 .  
 For other MPs, the legislation was necessary because unforeseen events might 
happen: excess reoccurs through emergency statements and the state is assembled as 
potentially unprepared as well as possessing a responsibility to be prepared. An MP 
supportive of the measure recalled an event as he supported the change in wording:   
 
“I can look back upon disasters which were quite unexpected. I remember 
with vivid clarity the 1953 floods along the East Coast, which grievously 
affected my constituency, among others. Nobody imagined that there was 
any danger of flooding upon that scale at the time, and I am sure that if my 
right hon. Friend had introduced this legislation prior to those floods 
people would have said, "What a ridiculous thing to talk about. Such a 
thing could not happen." But it did. 
Furthermore, in the complex industrial life in which we live today products 
are being manufactured which have never been manufactured here before, 
and new scientific techniques and devices are being adopted. It is, 
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therefore, right to visualise the possibility of a quite unforeseen disaster 
occurring.”27  
 
The Act became, then, a prudent means of responding to the problem of the 
‘unexpected’ or ‘unforeseen’ and the limits of the state’s imagination. The Bill was one 
part of a wider shift involving the expansion of the problem of the ‘unforeseen’ to any 
event alongside an expanded sense of not only what threatens to disrupt, but also the 
contingencies that a ‘prudent’ or ‘responsible’ government should take ‘reasonable 
steps’ to prepare for. By 1964, the existence of emergency legislation has become taken 
for granted within parliament and contestation is a matter of disagreement about 
whether or not the state is sufficiently prepared: the “too little” of the state, which 
Foucault shows is the flipside of the concern with “too much” (Foucault 2018: 322). 
  
Scene 3: 1973 
 
What is played out in the mid 1960s is not simply, then, the liberal concern with 
the excessiveness of the state. As in 1920, that concern meets an anxiety about the 
excessiveness of events and the credibility of the promise of response. The assembly 
and disassembly of the promise of the prepared state when faced with events 
reappears within the UK state at various times after 1964, although the Emergency 
Powers Act is not replaced until 2003-2004 (on which see Anderson & Adey 2012). 
What results are various scenes of emergency in which proposals to expand the scope 
of emergency powers are deliberated against a background of the ‘changing 
circumstances’ of events. One significant occasion is in 1973, the year of the last 
declaration of a state of emergency that I began the paper with. In the midst of ongoing 
industrial disrupts, global economic crises, and a changing economy, the Industrial 
Relations Policy Committee ask the newly formed Civil Contingencies Unit (CCU) to 
review the requirements for emergency powers. What surfaces in this scene – a scene 
constituted through letters, notes and a report – is a concern with the volatility of 
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emergency powers. This is the state that risks governing “too much” (Foucault 2018) 
and therefore cannot control the effects of its own actions. Here we find another 
iteration of the concern with the excessiveness of the state – but it is channelled into 
speculation on the unpredictable effects of declarations and regulations.  
 Underpinning many of the submissions to the review was a need to avoid 
unduly “restrictive” definitions of the circumstances on which an emergency might 
be proclaimed. However, there was no unanimity within the state about the changing 
threat. The Department of Employment, for example, argued that “An impressionistic 
view of the risks of industrial action ahead is not, I suggest, a good starting point for 
considering whether amendments of the 1920 Act is necessary”28 . Nor was there 
agreement about what should be protected by the providential state. One typical 
concern was whether the list of circumstances upon which a proclamation can be 
issued should be widened to include interference with communications or health 
services. In a ‘note’ from the Cabinet Office described by its author as “a first shot at 
defining this rather nebulous problem [of the requirements of emergency powers] and 
how it might be tackled” the complexities of expanding to ‘telecommunications’ were 
discussed: 
  
“How widely or narrowly should they be defined? Are “communications” 
just “telecommunications” or, bearing in mind the importance which the 
Government attaches to public opinion, and the changing circumstances of 
the communications media, is there any case for taking emergency powers 
in this field, too? Are there other categories which should be included? Is it 
now desirable to take account of the effect of action against key computer 
installations? Are these sufficiently covered under the existing categories 
of services or should some additional provision be made?”29 
 
The deliberation was around, then, the sufficiency of existing powers faced not only 
with changing events but with attempting to govern a changing society in which it 
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was no longer clear what exactly counted as the ‘essentials of life’. For example, 
expanding powers to telecommunications is rejected by the CCU in part based on a 
letter from The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which reported no 
advantage in amendment because of the range of alternative measures enabled by 
other pieces of existing sector specific legislation30.  
The promise is very similar to in 1964: the prepared, reasonable, state in a 
changing world of events and conditions that threaten the capacity to prepare. As well 
as this doubt about whether the state will protect life, what is disassembled in this 
scene is faith in the utility of emergency powers for the state. Partly, this is because 
departments place faith in existing, ordinary powers. But, it is also because changes in 
the organisation of economy reduce the effectiveness of powers that depend, in 
different ways, on some degree of compulsion from a centre. For example, the 
Department of the Environment wrote “It is difficult to envisage the way the 
application of emergency powers could assist the health service, or communications 
or computer installations, because generally all these depend on expert staff who 
cannot be easily withdrawn from other sources”31. Likewise, the Department of the 
Environment stressed the interrelated and complex nature of emergencies. Their letter 
is worth quoting at length:  
 
“The Act is essentially defensive in character, presupposing that the 
Government can provide some alternative service. In the event it is clear 
that this is no longer the case in many instances, partly because services 
which can be hit by strikers are now more complex and partly because they 
are more interrelated so that a comparatively limited action can repercuss 
throughout a complete activity … In the broader sense it seems unlikely 
that the current Act could be modified in a way to provide an effective 
instrument against a deliberate and sustained attempt to cause widespread 
disruption to the life of the community or to the economy. Hence the 
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Departmental view that it is best to leave well alone and not to seek 
extension of powers under the Act”32. 
   
Other departments similarly emphasised the limited contribution of emergency 
powers to governing the type of disruption that are strikes, and highlighted other 
ways of governing through the achievement of consent. The Welsh office wrote:  
 
“Post-war history does suggest that emergency powers are only on 
particular and a small number of occasions necessary to contribute to the 
achievement of the Government’s objectives, and the contribution is in a 
substantial part psychological. In all strikes, there has been a high level of 
‘makeshift’ performances by other members of the industry or service 
concerned, by local authorities and by others. Indeed, the effects of most 
strikes seem to have been eased largely through a miscellany of makeshift 
arrangements and not by the specific use of emergency powers”33.  
 
There was also a trace of something else: that the occasion of the use of emergency 
powers was a scene of intensified vulnerability for the state. It is when the capacity to 
govern is directly placed in question and when other sources of authority emerge. 
Following a warning by the Department of Employment that prohibiting picketing at 
essential installations would lead to “deliberately contrived confrontations with the 
Law” in which the “resulting situations would be ugly”34, the MoD wrote:  
 
“To the extent that these are useful weapons of crisis management we must 
be careful not to blunt their efficiency by attempting to resort to them in 
circumstances in which, as Douglas Smith [Department for Employment] 
has pointed out, the probable consequences would be a confrontation in 
which the will of the Government could not easily be enforced”35 
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The risk was not only that emergency powers are ineffective as pragmatic means of 
governing the economy, but that they may both intensify the event they are designed 
to end and, in doing so, reveal the fragility of the state.  
    
Concluding Comments: Disassembling the Emergency State 
 
We reach an impasse: emergency powers have been extended beyond strikes 
and are presented as necessary because of the potential weakness of the state faced 
with events but in 1973 doubts surround their efficacy and effects. What is questioned, 
in the year of the last declaration that I began the paper with, is their utility as a means 
of governing events in an increasingly complex economy. Alongside this practical 
objection to their use, there is also a background sense within the state that the use of 
emergency powers has itself become a dangerous occasion of vulnerability. Partly, 
this is because they may prove to be inadequate when faced with events. More than 
this, though, there is a sense that emergency powers are unpredictable. Their use 
might lead to a loss of morale in the army, unwanted confrontations, and so on. What 
could in 1964 be likened by a government minister to ‘insurance’ with its connotations 
of prudence has become, by 1973 and in the midst of crisis, an unstable but still used 
power, unpredictable in its effects, always threatening to escalate events.  
The paper has focused on how one part of the emergency state – the promise 
of neutral and effective response – is disassembled and reassembled. What we see 
across the scenes is concern with two types of excess – of the state and of events. In 
part, this enacts the liberal concern with whether the state governs “too much or too 
little”, or what Foucault (2018: 322) calls the “irrationality peculiar to excessive 
government”. Concern with the excessive emergency state is enacted through 
anticipatory claims about the authoritarian state, in particular, but also the ineffective 
state. However, the relation with emergencies is not reducible to the liberal suspicion 
of government – what is not critiqued is the necessity or possibility of responding to 
emergencies per se (to paraphrase Foucault (2018: 319)). To go back to Ophir (2015), 
the expectation that the providential state should have control of events is re-enacted 
in scenes in which the excess of events is made present and actionable. The state 
suspects it might not be governing enough, that it might not be able to meet events. 
Here, it is not only the state that is a “supplement” (Foucault 2018: 319) to society, but 
emergencies that function as a dangerous “supplement” around which the promise of 
neutral and effective response exists on a threshold, being dis/re-assembled.  
The paper has two wider implications in addition to the need for more detailed 
work on forms and practices of contestation around state of emergency legislation 
across different state formations, and through different state practices. First, the paper 
has stayed with three ‘scenes of emergency’ in which the state relates to the excess that 
the term ‘emergency’ invokes and gestures towards. It is in and through ‘scenes of 
emergency’ that the state renders events governable whilst, at the same time, the 
state’s capacity to act and control events is dis/reassembled. The scenes described in 
this paper – composed of future orientated practices of discussion and contestation 
surrounding emergency powers legislation – are but one type of scene. This opens up 
a research agenda on the different ‘scenes of emergency’ through which emergency 
states are (dis/re)assembled and the problem that the events or conditions that are 
governed as emergencies pose for the state. A scene of emergency is not every time an 
emergency is materially, imaginatively or performatively present. What defines a 
‘scene’ is that some kind of excess is present that reveals or exposes the limits of the 
state’s capacity to protect life through anticipation and response. How, then, are 
events made present through state practices of legislating, planning, exercising, 
responding, and so on? In what ways is that which is outside of the state’s capacities 
reincorporated as emergency assemblages form, deform and reform? Second, in 
relation to emergent work on assembling the state, the paper has stayed with 
occasions in which some kind of state effect – here the promise of response – is being 
disassembled and reassembled. Recognising the intimacy of processes of dis and 
reassembly, pushes assemblage related work on the state to focus on occasions when 
‘state effects’ are at a threshold. Where the term threshold names a space-time of (more 
or less abrupt, more or less intense) transition in which new state effects may be 
beginning, and existing state effects may be ending. Thresholds are, then, occasions of 
indeterminacy in which what the state is and does is placed in question, whether 
momentarily or for the duration of an ongoing crisis. They will vary across different 
states and state practices and functions. In the scenes in this paper, what is dis and 
reassembled is the promise of a specific type of prepared state that can control events 
and acts with neutral benevolence to protect life. In different scenes of emergency, 
other elements that compose emergency assemblages may be dis and re-assembled: 
the plan or protocol that requires revision, equipment that does not work, as well as 
other immaterial promises and threats, ideals and fantasies, about the state.  
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